Bauman et al. 2014 – After Snowden¶

In brief

A collective article by seven scholars on what the Snowden revelations about the NSA and its partners mean for world politics (p. 121) [U]. The authors argue that the debate cannot be limited to surveillance versus privacy; much more is at stake (p. 121) [U]. They describe a transnational network of intelligence services and private companies that blurs the line between domestic and foreign – a ‘Möbius strip’ (pp. 122–126) [U]. The article then discusses the impact on national security, diplomacy, human rights, democracy, subjectivity and everyday acceptance of surveillance (pp. 121, 128–143) [U].

Research question and main claim¶

The article seeks to describe the specificities of cyber mass surveillance and investigate its impact on national security, diplomacy, human rights, democracy, subjectivity and obedience (p. 121) [U].
Main claim: the NSA practices are indicators of a larger transformation of the boundaries of national security, due to transnationalisation, digitisation and privatisation (p. 126) [U].
A ‘digitized reason of state’ is performed by a heterogeneous complex of public and private professionals (p. 126) [U].
The relationship between liberty and security cannot be understood as a ‘balance’ (p. 137) [U].

Theoretical perspective¶

Critical security studies and surveillance studies, which the authors say must be rethought (p. 124) [U].
Bigo on the Möbius strip of internal and external security and on transnational guilds of security professionals (pp. 126–127) [U].
Foucault's Security, Territory, Population (2007) on security as production rather than repression (p. 139) [U], and his ‘capillaries of power’ (p. 141) [U].
Bauman and Lyon's ‘liquid surveillance’ (p. 141) [U]. Agamben on the shift from politics to policing (p. 141) [U].
International human rights law (UDHR, ICCPR) (pp. 131–133) [U].

Empirical material and context¶

The Snowden documents and press coverage: PRISM, Xkeyscore, Upstream, Tempora, Dishfire and others (pp. 121–123) [U].
Brazil's and Germany's reactions, and the UN General Assembly resolution on the right to privacy (18 December 2013) (pp. 128–134) [U].
Norway is named among smaller states that strongly supported the work on the resolution, together with Austria, Hungary, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, and among countries on whose behalf the German representative spoke at the Human Rights Council (pp. 133–134) [U].
An Angus Reid poll on attitudes to Snowden in the US, Canada and the UK (p. 141) [U].
Period: written in early 2014, a few months after the first revelations (p. 141) [U].

Method¶

Collective essay where different authors' perspectives are put together in sections on security, geopolitics, law, democracy, subjectivity and everyday life [T – characterisation].

Key concepts¶

Concept	How the source defines or uses it	Page	U/T
Möbius strip	The line between foreign and domestic becomes a strip where inside and outside merge	126, 128	U
digitized reason of state	Reason of state performed by a transnational complex of public and private security professionals	126	U
data subject	A conditional form of existence whose rights depend on its position in digital networks	129	U
guild	Asymmetrical, hierarchical networks of intelligence services	126–127	U
privacy vs. data protection	The right to privacy is the overarching human right; states' duty to protect data arises from it	131–132	U
bulk access vs. mass surveillance	Competing terms used to legitimise or delegitimise	140	U
liquid surveillance	Surveillance that is fluid, slippery and hard to grasp	141	U
familiarity, fear, fun	Three factors that make surveillance publicly acceptable	142	U

How privacy and private data are understood¶

As a human right: the right to respect for private and family life is the overarching right, and the state's duty to protect personal data arises from it (pp. 131–132) [U].
Consent to use of personal data belongs to the individual, not the state, and requires purpose limitation and prohibits function creep (p. 131) [U].
Interference must be lawful, narrow, necessary, proportionate and subject to judicial oversight; ‘Mass surveillance is, by definition, arbitrary’ (p. 132) [U].
Personal data consist of both content and metadata (p. 123) [U].
The debate cannot be limited to surveillance versus privacy (p. 121) [U].
Personal data collected for commercial purposes are handed over to intelligence services without users' knowledge (p. 123) [U].

Arguments and findings¶

Intelligence services claim they need more data and more exchange, with less control and oversight (p. 122) [U].
Surveillance can cover a suspect's connections three ‘hops’ away; analysts visualise relations rather than reading content (pp. 124–125) [U].
Fears about Big Brother are largely irrelevant; the issue is a speculative faith in systems that ‘read’ big data (p. 125) [U].
Services bypass limits on surveilling their own citizens through ‘citizen privacy shopping’ with other services (p. 125) [U].
States resisting mass surveillance may end up building their own surveillance capacity – a ‘digitized geopolitics’ (pp. 129–131) [U].
Unchecked secrecy by intelligence agencies is devastating for democracy, which depends on people's knowledge (p. 137) [U].
It is not that we are all suspects, but that our data might be seen as useful in the future (p. 138) [U].
The public reacted with surprising equanimity; social media users engage in ‘DIY’ self-surveillance (pp. 142–143) [U].

Limitations the source itself mentions¶

What we know, and what it adds up to, remains uncertain (p. 134) [U].
Only a few months had passed, so there was little in-depth analysis of public views (pp. 141) [U].
They limit legal detail to a minimum (p. 131) [U].

What the source does not cover¶

Norway's own surveillance practices or documents; Norway appears only as a supporter of the UN resolution [T].
The state's use of personal data for welfare or administration; the focus is intelligence and security [T].

Possible relevance for the thesis¶

One of few sources in the list that mentions Norway explicitly, in the context of the UN resolution on privacy (pp. 133–134) [U]. This may be a point of departure for how Norway presents itself internationally on privacy [T].
The distinction between privacy as a human right and data protection as a derived duty (pp. 131–132) may help read how Norwegian documents frame the two [T].
The critique of ‘balance’ between liberty and security (p. 137) is relevant if Norwegian documents use balancing language [T].

Connections to other sources¶

Gros et al. 2017 – published in the same journal three years later and cites this article (Gros et al. pp. 73–75) [T – from the Gros card].
Foucault 2008 – Bauman et al. cite Foucault 2007, not the panopticism text (pp. 139, 144) [U].
Solove 2011 – both criticise the ‘balance’ framing of security and liberty, and both mention ‘nothing to hide’ (Bauman et al. p. 140) [T]. Bauman et al. also call the unease about metadata ‘Kafkaesque’ (p. 141) [U], as Solove does with his Kafka metaphor [T].
Fairfield & Engel 2015 – thematic: both use Snowden and PRISM as examples of corporate data reaching the state [T].

Key quotes¶

“The debate cannot be limited to the United States versus the rest of the world or to surveillance versus privacy; much more is at stake.” (p. 121)

“Mass surveillance is, by definition, arbitrary.” (p. 132)

“The right to consent or refuse use of personal data belongs to the individual, not the state.” (p. 131)

“Yet the relationship between liberty and security cannot be understood as a balance in the usual senses of this term.” (p. 137)

“It is hence not that we are all suspects now, but rather that our data inputs and networks might be deemed of value, understood in terms of utility, at some point in the future.” (p. 138)

Open questions for Rebekka¶

Is Norway's role in the 2013 UN resolution something your documents refer to?
Do Norwegian documents separate privacy as a human right from data protection, as this article does?
Is security/intelligence part of your material, or do you focus on other areas of state data use?
Do the documents use ‘balance’ language between privacy and other interests?