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FFI report 26/003 – Increasing, Complex and Opaque

Description, not analysis

This card describes the document. Interpretation and analysis are Rebekka's work in the next phase.

Document type and genre

  • A research report from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI report 26/003), dated 27 January 2026 (p. 1) [U]. Its English title is Increasing, Complex and Opaque – Mapping foreign influence in connection with the 2025 Norwegian elections (p. 2) [U].
  • The report is commissioned by a ministry and is a mapping, not a policy document; it does not propose measures [T].

Author, mandate and origin

  • Written by FFI together with Analyse & Tall and Common Consultancy, commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (Kommunal- og distriktsdepartementet, KDD) (pp. 3, 7) [U].
  • The fourth report under KDD's assignment for 2023–2025, and the sixth since 2021 (p. 7) [U].
  • The assignment is to map whether foreign actors have tried to influence Norwegians in connection with the election (p. 12) [U].
  • Approved by research manager Lea Bjørgul and research director Janet Blatny (p. 2) [U].

Structure

  • Summary in Norwegian and English (pp. 3–4)
  • Foreword (p. 7)
  • Ch. 1 Introduction: threat picture and a more complex information environment (pp. 9–12)
  • Ch. 2 Analysis design and data: hypothesis, definition of ‘influence’ (påvirkning), theoretical framework, platforms (pp. 13–19)
  • Ch. 3 Challenges and limitations, with a section on privacy, copyright and ethics (pp. 20–21)
  • Ch. 4 Analyses and results: analysis 1 (Russian and Chinese actors), analysis 2 (inauthentic behaviour), analysis 3 (trust in the election) (pp. 22–72)
  • Ch. 5 Ten case examples (pp. 73–124)
  • Ch. 6 Conclusion (pp. 125–127)
  • Annexes A–C and references (pp. 128 ff.)

How privacy and private data are defined and framed

  • Privacy (personvern) is not defined. It is treated as a framework for the researchers' own data collection (p. 20) [U].
  • The report states that any collection of data from social media may contain personal data (personopplysninger), and that the Personal Data Act (personopplysningsloven) sets strict requirements (p. 20) [U].
  • The project has a data processing agreement (databehandleravtale) following the Data Protection Authority's guidance, a risk assessment and a protocol for handling personal data (p. 20) [U].
  • According to the authors, the examples in the report contain no personal data (p. 12) [U].
  • Profiles judged to be inauthentic and anonymous are described without pseudonymisation because they are not considered to contain personal data; one private profile is pseudonymised. FFI's legal department and data protection officer were consulted (pp. 109–110, note 226) [U].
  • The report itself notes that the analyses rely on a predefined selection of known profiles, and that only four platforms were examined (p. 20) [U].
  • Facebook's API anonymises comments on public posts (p. 17) [U].

Problems the document describes

  • The report uses the EEAS FIMI definition and specifies ‘negative impact’ as attempts aimed at the election result, turnout, trust in the conduct of the election, the political debate, division of the population, or undermining trust (tillit) in politicians, Norwegian authorities or democracy (p. 13) [U].
  • Influence in connection with elections has become an increasing and more complex threat (p. 11) [U].
  • Russian actors mention Norway about 48 times per day, an increase of about 55 percent; they try to weaken support for Ukraine, portray Norway as ‘russophobic’ and accuse Norwegian media of fake news (pp. 3, 22) [U].
  • Chinese actors mention Norway more often and with more Norwegian-language content (from 6 to 831 posts), in line with the doctrine ‘Tell the China story well’ (pp. 3, 23) [U].
  • The pro-Russian campaign #OpNorway is the first time FFI has found a foreign influence attempt directly linked to the election; it is assessed to have had no effect (pp. 3, 126) [U].
  • A network of seven anonymous TikTok profiles tried to undermine three parties (Ap, Rødt and SV); the actor may be Norwegian (pp. 3, 45) [U].
  • Social media's lack of transparency and data access makes it difficult or impossible to find out who is behind activity (pp. 3, 7, 10) [U].
  • Meta's closure of CrowdTangle has reduced the possibility of studying spread on Facebook (p. 21) [U].
  • Influence should be understood as a continuous challenge, not as isolated events (p. 127) [U].

Solutions and measures proposed

  • No concrete measures are proposed [T].
  • The report ends by stating that the ability to understand, detect and handle illegitimate influence should be seen as fundamental to protecting democracy and Norway's security policy interests (p. 127) [U].

Actors mentioned

Actor Role in the document Page
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (KDD) Commissioner 3, 7
FFI, Analyse & Tall, Common Consultancy Authors 1, 3
Russian and Chinese state actors, state-controlled media and proxy sources Influence actors 22–23
PST, Norwegian Intelligence Service, NSM, NESS Sources of threat assessments 9–10
Meta, TikTok, X, Telegram Platforms; lack of transparency and data access 10–11, 21
Glenn Diesen and Steigan.no Used to legitimise pro-Russian narratives 3
NoName057(16) Pro-Russian hacker group behind #OpNorway 126
Data Protection Authority (Datatilsynet) Guidance for the data processing agreement 20
Norwegian media (DN, VG, Faktisk.no, Aftenposten) Exposed anonymous political profiles 10–11

Document chain

  • Builds on FFI's earlier reports for KDD from 2021–2025 (p. 7) [U].
  • Uses the EEAS FIMI definition and cites the third EEAS FIMI report (pp. 9, 13) [U].
  • Cites threat assessments for 2025 from PST, the Intelligence Service, NSM and NESS (pp. 9–10) [U].
  • Cites Kunstig intelligens og demokratiske valg (Schia et al. 2025, KDD) (p. 9, note 10) [U].
  • The Personal Data Act, the Copyright Act, the GDPR and the ethical guidelines for internet research (pp. 20–21, 110) [U].
  • Theoretical framework: ‘Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem’ from the U.S. Department of State (p. 14) [U].

Key quotes

“Med unntak av #OpNorway kan vi ikke påvise utenlandsk påvirkning direkte rettet mot selve valget.” (p. 3)

“De sosiale medienes mangel på transparens gjør attribusjon vanskelig og dels umulig.” (p. 3)

“Vi legger til grunn at demokratiske verdier, sannferdighet, transparens, valgets integritet og tillit i samfunnet er positivt og at påvirkningsforsøk som kan true disse regnes som negativt.” (p. 14)

“Enhver innsamling av data fra sosiale medier kan inneholde personopplysninger, selv om denne kartleggingen ikke har som formål å samle inn dette.” (p. 20)

“I sum peker utviklingen mot et informasjonsmiljø der påvirkning i økende grad retter seg mot selve rammene for meningsdannelse: tillit, orienteringsevne og opplevd virkelighet.” (p. 127)

Observations that may be worth examining

  • Privacy appears here as a constraint and a set of rules the researchers must follow, not as a topic in itself. What does that say about where privacy belongs in documents on information influence? [T]
  • The report calls for more transparency and data access from the platforms (pp. 3, 21). How does that relate to privacy considerations? [T]
  • State-commissioned research collects over 22 million posts and comments (p. 3). How is this collection justified? [T]
  • Who counts as a legitimate or illegitimate actor when it comes to Norwegian anonymous profiles (pp. 12, 127)? [T]

Open questions for Rebekka

  • Is the report a primary document because KDD commissioned it, or because it expresses the state's understanding of the information environment?
  • Do you want to use more of FFI's reports in the series (2021–2025)?
  • How does election influence connect to your question about the use of private data?
  • Should the cases in chapter 5 be read closely?